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INTRODUCTION 
The English East India Company was first chartered in 1600, en-
dured until the late nineteenth century, and, in a clever act of corporate 
resurrection, has even recently returned as a global, upmarket retail outlet 
selling fine foods and commemorative coins.1 It has also endured in the 
popular imagination and culture, churning out heroes and villains alike in 
film, television, and video games.2 The script writer for a forthcoming 
BBC miniseries, in which the East India Company stars as the prime an-
tagonist, even noted recently that the Company was like “the CIA, the 
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 1. East India Company Returns After 135-Year Absence, BBC (Aug. 13, 2010), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-10971109; see also THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, 
http://www.theeastindiacompany.com (last visited Dec. 23, 2015). 
 2. E.g., BEYOND THE MASK (Burns Family Studios 2015); PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: AT 
WORLD’S END (Walt Disney Pictures 2007); EAST INDIA COMPANY (Nitro Games 2009). 
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NSA, and the biggest, baddest multinational corporation on earth” 
wrapped into one corporation.3 
All of this attention of late to one of the largest and most enduring 
corporations of its time, which managed a commercial and political sys-
tem separated by half a world at upwards of a year and half’s distance, is 
perhaps unsurprising given the great legal, political, and economic co-
nundrums surrounding the modern multinational corporation, from ques-
tions about global management to controversial issues such as tax inver-
sions, monopoly, state-owned corporations, as well as the corporate per-
son’s rights to free speech, religion, and so on.4 However, from outland-
ish film productions to the most sober of scholarship, the connections 
between the Company’s past and our present seem to have become all 
things to all people, stretched almost to the point of breaking. 
Though it would be impossible to be exhaustive, this Article none-
theless seeks to outline the various ways in which the East India Compa-
ny’s legacy has been drawn upon in a range of fields, but especially legal 
and business scholarship, for a wide range of purposes. In so doing, it 
proposes that the sheer diversity of uses to which the Company’s history 
has been put, as well as the lack of any agreement about the meaning and 
nature of such comparisons, might suggest that the lessons the East India 
Company can offer to the financial, commercial, and organizational his-
tory of the modern corporation, while inherently interesting and heuristi-
cally instructive, must necessarily be limited, cautionary, and entertained 
at one’s own risk. It is not that situating the East India Company either as 
part of a genealogy of the present or as a comparative model for contem-
porary business organization or practice is in itself problematic. Instead, 
the issues arise from the central premise upon which many such perspec-
tives have been based: namely, that the East India Company was, funda-
mentally and primarily, a commercial body. Attempts to situate the “les-
sons” of the early Company squarely within the realm of business history 
and the history of capitalism may thus miss the larger significance of the 
Company, both in its time and for contemporary concerns. Like other 
corporations engaged in trade and colonization, the East India Company 
was a corporate body that ideologically and institutionally merged the 
concerns of commerce with the prerogatives of governance. As such, it 
                                                        
 3. Anita Singh & Jasper Copping, BBC to Break ‘Taboo’ with ‘Inaccurate’ Portrayal of East 
India Company, TELEGRAPH (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/tvandradio/bbc/ 
10743407/BBC-to-break-Taboo-with-inaccurate-portrayal-of-East-India-Company.html. 
 4. For just a few media treatments, see, for example, The Company That Ruled the Waves, 
ECONOMIST, Dec. 17, 2011, at 109; William Dalrymple, The East India Company: The Original 
Corporate Raiders, GUARDIAN (Mar. 4, 2015, 12:59 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2015/mar/04/east-india-company-original-corporate-raiders?CMP=share_btn_link. 
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was no “mere merchant,” but rather blurred the lines between private and 
public and challenged the reach of municipal law and the spatial dimen-
sions of claims to jurisdiction and sovereignty.5 
With this premise in mind, after examining the various ways in 
which the East India Company has been regarded within the realm of 
business history, this Article proceeds by reflecting on scholarship that 
instead suggests the East India Company might better serve our contem-
porary concerns if we consider the assorted and interchangeable roles 
that multinational corporations played in the early modern period as well 
as in the world today: as mercantile firms, as political agents, as sover-
eign bodies, and as international actors. It then concludes, prospectively 
and with some hesitation, that the Company’s role as a transnational le-
gal actor may be the best way to “think with” its history, illuminating the 
long historical tradition of corporations that possessed legal and moral 
personalities that transcended their relationships to national and territori-
al states. In other words, if the East India Company offers us a plausible 
argument for our present, it seems more likely to be found not in the 
realm of commerce but in the world of politics, and in particular, in in-
ternational law. 
I. COMPANY AS MERCHANT  
Chartered on New Year’s Eve, 1600, the English East India Com-
pany was neither the first nor the last of the corporate bodies that would 
shepherd the expansion of Elizabethan and Jacobean English trade and 
plantation. However, its subsequent history has garnered it to some ex-
tent an outsized reputation as an institutional innovation. Having become 
remarkably profitable in the seventeenth century, it was also remarkably 
controversial, standing across the century at the center of major debates 
regarding overseas trade and commerce.6 After 1709, the Company was a 
pillar of public finance, its stock permanently grafted onto the national 
debt of the newly formed British military-fiscal state.7 Following the Bat-
tle of Plassey in 1757 and the assumption of the Mughal office of diwan, 
revenue collector, in 1765, until the mid-nineteenth century, the Compa-
                                                        
 5. I have explored this argument much more extensively elsewhere. See generally PHILIP J. 
STERN, THE COMPANY–STATE: CORPORATE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE EARLY MODERN 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA (2011). 
 6. WILLIAM J. BARBER, BRITISH ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND INDIA, 1600–1858: A STUDY IN 
THE HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS ch. 3 (1975). 
 7. See RON HARRIS, INDUSTRIALIZING ENGLISH LAW: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATION, 1720–1844, at 39–59 (2000). See generally JOHN BREWER, THE SINEWS OF POWER: 
WAR, MONEY AND THE ENGLISH STATE, 1688–1783 (1989); BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS, CITY OF 
CAPITAL: POLITICS AND MARKETS IN THE ENGLISH FINANCIAL REVOLUTION (1999). 
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ny expanded outside of its city-colonies of Madras, Bombay, and Calcut-
ta into a territorial power that formed the foundations for the British Em-
pire in India.8 
In many ways, this teleology as an imperial power has done a great 
deal over the past few centuries to interest historians, particularly be-
cause against the backdrop of the rise of the modern state in the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries, it appeared to be such a curiosity: a com-
pany that had become an empire. At the same time, interest in its early 
development if anything has surged over the last several years, as schol-
arship, politics, and public debate try to make sense of the difficult-to-
categorize role of multinational corporations in an increasingly global-
ized world.9 While the lion’s share of the historiography on the East In-
dia Company painstakingly treats its past in its own context and on its 
own terms, there have been many who have turned to it—with varying 
degrees of nuance and specificity—either as exemplar or origin story of 
the modern corporation and harbinger of something to come. Its larger-
than-life reputation leads to it being frequently cited in superlative: for 
example, as the “first commercial corporation,”10 the “first UK Corpora-
tion to operate for a profit”11 or the “original too-big-to-fail”12 which was 
“saved by history’s first mega-bailout.”13 For some, the East India Com-
pany reflects the triumphs of innovation, global management, and econ-
omies of scale represented by modern multinational capitalism: “the 
Google of its time,” according to Sanjiv Mehta, the owner of the newly 
resuscitated East India Company luxury goods store, “[a] great pioneer-
ing spirit . . . [with] impeccable pedigree and enviable heritage.”14 
                                                        
 8. The literature on the Company’s expansion in the late eighteenth century, both in India and 
Britain, is extensive. See, e.g., H. V. BOWEN, THE BUSINESS OF EMPIRE: THE EAST INDIA COMPANY 
AND IMPERIAL BRITAIN, 1756–1833 (2005); P.J. MARSHALL, THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF 
EMPIRES: BRITAIN, INDIA, AND AMERICA C. 1750–1783 (2005); ROBERT TRAVERS, IDEOLOGY AND 
EMPIRE IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY INDIA: THE BRITISH IN BENGAL (2007); JON E. WILSON, THE 
DOMINATION OF STRANGERS: MODERN GOVERNANCE IN EASTERN INDIA, 1780–1835 (2008). 
 9. Philip J. Stern, History and Historiography of the English East India Company: Past, Pre-
sent, and Future!, 7 HIST. COMPASS 1146, 1147–48 (2009). 
 10. REBECCA SPENCER, CORP. WATCH, CORPORATE LAW AND STRUCTURES: EXPOSING THE 
ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM 3, 6 (2004), available at https://corporatewatch.org/sites/default/files/ 
corporate_structures.pdf. 
 11. Tony Lawson, The Modern Corporation: The Site of a Mechanism (of Global Social 
Change) that Is Out-of-Control?, in GENERATIVE MECHANISMS TRANSFORMING THE SOCIAL ORDER 
205, 221 (Margaret S. Archer ed., 2015). 
 12. Nick Robins, East India Company: The Original Too-Big-to-Fail Firm, BLOOMBERG VIEW 
(Mar. 12, 2013, 11:48 AM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-03-12/east-india-
company-the-original-too-big-to-fail-firm. 
 13. Dalrymple, supra note 4. 
 14. Rachel Rickard Straus, East India Co Is Back, with Indian Owner, ECON. TIMES (Aug. 16, 
2010, 6:15 AM), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-08-16/news/27606204_1_ 
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Such sentiments are not merely confined to corporate branding. 
Even one of the most prolific of the early Company’s historians suggest-
ed that,  
In many ways, the East India Company was the direct ancestor of 
the modern giant business firm, handling a multitude of trading 
products and operating in an international setting. . . . The type of 
problems which the Company encountered in the routine organisa-
tion of its trade, as for example in maintaining an operational 
schedule, in decision-making under uncertainty, and in resolving 
conflict among its members and servants, bear a striking resem-
blance to the theoretical problems posed by the present-day large 
organisations.15  
Indeed, the notion that the East India Company is somehow genetically 
related to the modern multinational is fairly common. To one interpreter, 
it was “the mother of the modern corporation, pioneering the modern 
joint stock model of financing, as well as the trans-national systems of 
business administration and governance.”16 To another, “[t]he modern 
corporation is . . . a child of the East India Company.”17 To another still, 
it was, along with others of its time, not the modern corporation’s parent 
so much as its “embryo.”18 
The East India Company and its ilk have been identified as progeni-
tors of everything from modern private military companies19 to compa-
nies operating across borders in the European Union.20 Indeed, the one 
feature that continues to stand out for modern interpreters about the East 
India Company is of course its supposedly international or transnational 
character. “The Hudson Bay and East India trading companies of Eliza-
bethan and Georgian times,” it appeared to the antitrust lawyer Sigmund 
                                                                                                                            
brand-new-avatar-e-commerce. 
 15. K. N. CHAUDHURI, THE TRADING WORLD OF ASIA AND THE ENGLISH EAST INDIA COM-
PANY: 1660–1760, at 21 (1978). 
 16. Nick Robins, Lecture at the City of London Festival: This Imperious Company—The East 
India Company and the Modern Multinational (June 27, 2008), available at 
http://www.gresham.ac.uk/lectures-and-events/this-imperious-company-the-east-india-company-
and-the-modern-multinational; see also NICK ROBINS, THE CORPORATION THAT CHANGED THE 
WORLD: HOW THE EAST INDIA COMPANY SHAPED THE MODERN MULTINATIONAL (2006) [hereinaf-
ter ROBINS, CORPORATION]. 
 17 . Gurcharan Das, Foreword to TIRTHANKAR ROY, THE EAST INDIA COMPANY: THE 
WORLD’S MOST POWERFUL CORPORATION, at x –xi (2012). 
 18. LESLIE A. WHITE, MODERN CAPITALIST CULTURE 69 (Robert L. Carneiro et al. eds., 2008). 
 19. CHRISTOPHER KINSEY, CORPORATE SOLDIERS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: THE RISE 
OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES 38–40 (2006). 
 20. Philippe Pellé, Companies Crossing Borders Within Europe, UTRECHT L. REV., Mar. 2008, 
at 6. 
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Timberg in 1952, “have been replaced by modern international combines 
such as N.V. Phillips, Unilever, and International Telephone and Tele-
graph.”21 The transhemispheric ambit of the East India Company seems 
to offer a starting point for understanding the globalization not only of 
capitalism, but also of the origins of global corporate law in a global con-
text.22 
Though often such observations remain broad and generic, and usu-
ally simply passing preludes to more modern-focused studies, there are a 
number of historians who point quite specifically to features of the Com-
pany that, as with its Dutch counterpart, experimented with and greatly 
resembled the core features of modern corporate organization: status as 
legal persons, transferable shares, forms of limited liability, and especial-
ly, the institutional separation of managers (directors) from owners 
(shareholders).23 Indeed, at least one team of scholars has suggested it 
was the very conditions of commerce and colonization in Asia that pro-
duced the demand, over time, for innovations such as limited liability 
and legal personhood.24 Others have emphasized less the structural simi-
larity between early chartered companies and modern multinationals and 
focused more on a comparison of the complexity, volume, and manage-
ment of transactions involved in coordinating the early modern Eurasian 
trade.25 The Company has also been credited with laying the groundwork 
for modern global investment practices and law,26 and even, by one liter-
ary critic, with the modern usage of the concept and language of “in-
vestment” itself.27 
                                                        
 21. Sigmund Timberg, The Corporation as a Technique of International Administration, 19 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 739, 740 (1952). 
 22. Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Globalization of Corporate Law: The End of History or a Never-
Ending Story?, 86 WASH. L. REV 475, 481–82 (2011). 
 23. See, e.g., ROBERT B. MARKS, THE ORIGINS OF THE MODERN WORLD: FATE AND FORTUNE 
IN THE RISE OF THE WEST 98 (2007); K. N. Chaudhuri, The English East India Company in the 17th 
and 18th Centuries: A Pre-Modern Multinational Organization, in COMPANIES AND TRADE: ESSAYS 
ON OVERSEAS TRADING COMPANIES DURING THE ANCIEN RÉGIME 29, 29–30, 41 (Leonard Blussé & 
Femme Gaastra eds., 1981); Winfried van den Muijsenbergh, Corporate Governance: The Dutch 
Experience, 16 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 63, 63–64 (2002). See generally Oscar Gelderblom, Abe de Jong 
& Joost Jonker, The Formative Years of the Modern Corporation: The Dutch East India Company 
VOC, 1602–1623, 73 J. ECON. HIST. 1050 (2013). 
 24. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci et al., The Emergence of the Corporate Form 4–6, 9–24 (Amster-
dam Ctr. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 2013-02, 2013). 
 25. See, e.g., Ann M. Carlos & Stephen Nicholas, “Giants of an Earlier Capitalism”: The 
Chartered Companies as Modern Multinationals, 62 BUS. HIST. REV. 398, 400–02 (1988). 
 26. KATE MILES, THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: EMPIRE, ENVIRON-
MENT AND THE SAFEGUARDING OF CAPITAL 30–41 (2013). 
 27. VALERIE FORMAN, TRAGICOMIC REDEMPTIONS: GLOBAL ECONOMICS AND THE EARLY 
MODERN ENGLISH STAGE 5 (2008). Forman refers to the immediate “loss” of making an investment 
followed by the “future accumulation” of that investment paying out eventually. 
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In some cases, the early modern East India Company has served as 
a convenient starting point for challenging modernist and American-
centered narratives of the rise of the joint-stock corporation, and in par-
ticular the influential arguments associated with Alfred Chandler.28 For 
example, Anderson, McCormick, and Tollison have argued that the East 
India Company was originally conceived as a prototypical multidivision-
al firm of the sort Chandler insisted emerged three centuries later in the 
U.S. in the 1920s; to them, it was only against a dysfunction of political 
economy—namely, monopoly—that such an organizational scheme was 
abandoned and somewhat forgotten.29 Conversely, another business his-
torian has suggested that it was not until the East India Company’s later 
years, as it expanded in the early nineteenth century, that it came to re-
flect the schema set out by Chandler for defining the modern corporation, 
well after Anderson et al., but equally well before the technological and 
legal transformations of the “visible hand” that supposedly made the 
emergence of Chandler’s modern corporation possible.30 
Yet, just as the East India Company has served as evidence to pre-
date Chandler’s modern corporation, it has also allowed other historians 
to propose an entirely different genealogy of the Anglo-American corpo-
ration, one that bypasses the common explanation of its origin in the 
business practices of Italian city-states, such as double-entry bookkeep-
ing. In this case, one finds a gradual evolutionary theory of the corpora-
tion in which the East India Company serves as a critical transition—
even the “turning point”—between medieval forms like the guild and the 
regulated company, and the modern joint-stock company.31 Indeed, both 
the English and Dutch Companies have been credited, subject to some 
disagreement, with the accounting practices (also elsewhere said to have 
originated in Renaissance Italy) that supposedly gave rise to modern 
bourgeois capitalism itself.32 
                                                        
 28. Carlos & Nicholas, supra note 25, at 402–03. On Chandler, see, among many other works, 
ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN 
BUSINESS (1977). 
 29. Gary M. Anderson, Robert E. McCormick & Robert D. Tollison, The Economic Organiza-
tion of the English East India Company, 4 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 221, 227–37 (1983). 
 30. See generally P. Bruce Buchan, A Variation on the Origin and Characteristics of the Mod-
ern Corporation, 12 CAN. J. ADMIN. SCI. 1 (1995). 
 31. M. Schmitthoff, The Origin of the Joint-Stock Company, 3 U. TORONTO L.J. 74, 88–96 
(1939); CELIA WELLS, CORPORATIONS AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 82 (2d ed. 2001). 
 32. WARWICK FUNNELL & JEFFREY ROBERTSON, ACCOUNTING BY THE FIRST PUBLIC COM-
PANY: THE PURSUIT OF SUPREMACY 6–11 (2014); Ciarán Ó hÓgartaigh, Financial Accounting Prac-
tice, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO ACCOUNTING HISTORY 162, 164 (John Richard Edwards & 
Stephen P. Walker eds., 2008); R.A. Bryer, The History of Accounting and the Transition to Capital-
ism in England. Part Two: Evidence, 25 ACCT. ORGS. & SOC’Y 327, 347–69 (2000); Jeffrey Robert-
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The assumption that the East India Company sired the modern cor-
poration has opened it up to any number of examinations that suggest 
that it can and should be studied as an example to better understand 
modern business practices and structure. There are studies that look to 
the East India Company to better understand both the origin and structure 
of corporate management, such as boards of directors,33 and others that 
use the Company to test modern theories of the firm, for example, by 
suggesting the East India Company was a modern joint-stock corporation 
that nonetheless emerged without a fully functioning and free secondary 
stock market.34 Most common though seems to be the understanding of 
the Company as a case study in how multinational corporations might 
effectively reduce transaction costs or help find the Holy Grail of man-
agement studies, that is, a solution to the challenges hierarchical organi-
zations face in overcoming the principal-agent problem especially in 
complex long-distance trade. 35  Yet, more recently, sociologist Emily 
Erikson has argued that the early Company’s commercial networks re-
veal the converse lesson for modern organizations, suggesting instead 
that the East India Company’s longevity and institutional efficiency 
came not from a strong top-down structure but rather a decentralized sys-
tem that permitted, rather than restrained, independent action on the part 
of its “agents”: ship captains, employees engaged in private trade, and 
others. Activity outside the Company’s formal trade was, in this sense, 
not “a problem to be solved” but integral to the organization writ large.36 
If the East India Company’s successes have made it a model for 
some looking at contemporary business practices, its failures and excess-
es have also seemed to others to offer certain cautionary tales for today’s 
modern multinationals or for modern capitalism itself.37 In its most blunt 
form, such an argument proposes that the Company’s supposed trans-
                                                                                                                            
son & Warwick Funnell, The Dutch East-India Company and Accounting for Social Capital at the 
Dawn of Modern Capitalism 1602–1623, 37 ACCT. ORGS. & SOC’Y 342, 343 (2012). 
 33. P. Bruce Buchan, The Emergence of the Technostructure: Lessons from the East India 
Company, 1713–1836, 41 J. MGMT. HIST. 105, 115 (2003); Franklin A. Gevurtz, The European 
Origins and the Spread of the Corporate Board of Directors, 33 STETSON L. REV. 925, 929–30 
(2004). 
 34. Ron Harris, Law, Finance and the First Corporations, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE 
RULE OF LAW 145, 159–62 (James J. Heckman et al. eds., 2010). 
 35. Carlos & Nicholas, supra note 25, at 406; Ann M. Carlos & Stephen Nicholas, Theory and 
History: Seventeenth-Century Joint-Stock Chartered Trading Companies, 56 J. ECON. HIST. 916, 
921–23 (1996). 
 36. EMILY ERIKSON, BETWEEN MONOPOLY AND FREE TRADE: THE ENGLISH EAST INDIA COM-
PANY 1600–1757, at 18 (2014). 
 37 . Amy Kazmin, Empires Taken to Excess, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2015, 5:04 AM), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/14b0ff00-7d77-11e5-98fb-5a6d4728f74e.html#axzz3tW6Yadgc. 
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formation from a commercial body into a territorial empire illuminates 
the natural consequences of the unchecked power of private enterprise 
and the importance of regulation.38 Such warnings are not only in hind-
sight. Erika George, for example, has drawn comparisons between the 
“age of empire” and the “age of globalization,” seeing parallels in the 
sorts of critiques leveled by contemporaries at the East India Company—
abuse of power, exploitation, corruption, ambiguities of public–private 
relationships—that resemble those aimed at transnational conglomerates 
like Wal-Mart.39 Other historians suggest that its monopoly and partici-
pation in other commercial practices produced the first “consumer boy-
cott” in the form of both anti-slave trade and anti-tea protests in the late 
eighteenth century.40 Looser connections have been drawn between the 
critiques of the Company in both the late seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies and the modern history of fraudulent financial reporting.41 
Before one invests too much in this seemingly bull market—or per-
haps bubble—in lessons to be learned from the East India Company for 
the modern corporation, it is worth acknowledging that for every such 
claim of origin or parallel, there is a counterargument or caution to be 
heard about taking such connections too far. Indeed, there is hardly any 
consensus on these supposed lessons. For some, the problem is that such 
an origin story does not go back far enough, instead locating the begin-
nings of the modern corporation as early as the Roman Empire.42 For 
most critics, though, the problem is that any straightforward comparison 
ignores both the distinct nature of the early modern East India Company 
and the very specific historical context in which it was created and oper-
ated. More than three decades ago, Niels Steensgaard admonished those 
who indulged in the habit of seeing the English and Dutch East India 
Companies as ancestors of the modern corporation—indeed even as part 
of an evolutionary history of the corporation at all: 
                                                        
 38. See generally ROBINS, CORPORATION, supra note 16. 
 39. Erika R. George, The Enterprise of Empire: Evolving Understandings of Corporate Identity 
and Responsibility, in THE BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS LANDSCAPE: MOVING FORWARD, 
LOOKING BACK 19, 44, 48 (Jena Martin & Karen E. Bravo eds., 2015); Erika R. George, Incorporat-
ing Rights: Empire, Global Enterprise, and Global Justice, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 917, 944–45 
(2013). 
 40. See JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT HISTORY OF 
A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 27 (2003); Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corpo-
rations and Human Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 45, 49 (2002).  
 41. ZABIHOLLAH REZAEE & RICHARD RILEY, FINANCIAL STATEMENT FRAUD: PREVENTION 
AND DETECTION 16 (2d ed. 2010). 
 42. Ulrike Malmendier, Law and Finance “at the Origin,” 47 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1076, 
1076 (2009). 
432 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 39:423 
The purpose and function of [early modern chartered] companies 
may vary so widely that they sometimes seem to have nothing in 
common but the name. The assumption that the chartered compa-
nies may be placed in a chain of evolution linking the medieval 
forms of enterprise to the modern business corporation has further 
confused the issue. It should be stated emphatically that the char-
tered trading companies do not fit into such a linear concept, on the 
contrary the history of the company institution is rich in mutations 
and regressions. The companies were created in a unique encounter 
between political power and market oriented entrepreneurship; they 
were the result of dynamic improvisations and experiments, not the 
experience of generations.43 
From this perspective, it is hardly clear that the East India Company 
in fact possessed the markers of modern corporateness that seem to link 
it to its successors, such as limited liability, freely tradable shares, and, 
most importantly, the somewhat open administrative process of incorpo-
ration that came only in the nineteenth century.44 Furthermore, whether 
one sees the East India Company either as a shining exemplar of sophis-
ticated global multinational management in the pre-electricity (let alone 
pre-internet) age or as harbinger of the fate of neoliberalism unbounded, 
the greatest conceptual difficulty is to reconcile this legacy as the first 
“modern” multinational with its equally powerful reputation as an em-
blem of a bygone age of state-sponsored monopolism and “mercantilist” 
policy.45 Indeed, the East India Company, and the joint-stock company 
more generally, was Adam Smith’s prime example of precisely the sort 
of anachronistic and misguided forms of ancien régime capital organiza-
tion that prevented economic growth and produced mismanagement and 
abuse, ranging from financial corruption to territorial conquest.46 Thus, 
there emerges a great chasm between the East India Company and its 
later heirs if one considers that the Company’s most salient feature—a 
monopoly backed by a politically issued charter—no longer remains a 
                                                        
 43. Niels Steensgaard, The Companies as a Specific Institution in the History of European 
Expansion, in COMPANIES AND TRADE, supra note 23, at 245, 246–47. 
 44. Kenneth W. Dam, Equity Markets, the Corporation, and Economic Development 2–4 (John 
M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Paper No. 280, 2006). 
 45. See, e.g., ROBERT B. EKELUND, JR. & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, POLITICIZED ECONOMIES: 
MONARCHY, MONOPOLY, AND MERCANTILISM (1997). 
 46. Sankar Muthu, Adam Smith’s Critique of International Trading Companies: Theorizing 
“Globalization” in the Age of Enlightenment, 36 POL. THEORY 185, 199 (2008); Gary M. Anderson 
& Robert D. Tollison, Adam Smith’s Analysis of Joint-Stock Companies, 90 J. POL. ECON. 1237, 
1243–54 (1982). 
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normative feature of the modern corporation.47 As Ron Harris has ar-
gued, it was in fact only the severing of the connection between monopo-
ly and incorporation, not least through debates over the East India Com-
pany’s trade between 1813 and 1833, which permitted the emergence of 
the modern form of joint-stock corporations.48 
II. COMPANY AS SOVEREIGN 
The confusion and disagreement over the question of how and 
whether the English East India Company represented a development in 
the history of the corporation is instructive. It suggests not simply schol-
arly disagreement over the potential answers but perhaps the need to 
fundamentally reassess the premises of such a query: that is, the assump-
tion that the English East India Company was solely or even primarily a 
commercial body in the first place. As John Micklethwait and Adrian 
Wooldridge point out in their breezy survey of the history of the modern 
company: “The East India Company was more than just a modern com-
pany in embryo,” since it also maintained an army, territory, and a mas-
sive bureaucracy of “civil servants.”49 The Company combined the rights 
of private persons, such as to sue and be sued or contract debts, with fea-
tures of public sovereign power, such as the prerogative to wage war and 
conduct diplomacy, govern over people and places, coin money, and so 
on. Perhaps most importantly, it maintained the rights to own and dis-
pose of private property while also acting as a form of public govern-
ment, especially abroad.50 These two features became particularly inter-
twined through the seventeenth century; some among the East India 
Company leadership even regarded its English charters, as well as Mugal 
farmans and other Asian grants, as forms of property in themselves—
thus enshrining public responsibility in a form of private right.51 
This ambiguity in the nature and purpose of the Company also 
meant that its relationship with various juridical bodies was complex and 
inherently pluralistic. As a chartered body politic endowed with capaci-
ties of governance, the English East India Company was subject at vari-
ous times to common law and equity courts, civil law courts, or the pre-
rogatives and obligations of the law of nations. In its capacity as a com-
pany resident in London, an employer of English people, exporter of 
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English goods, and even representative of English interests, the East In-
dia Company was on any number of occasions judged by English courts 
to be a legal person subject to both English common and civil law. Its 
activities were thus encompassed within the jurisdictional claims of a 
range of English courts such as Chancery, King’s Bench, and the Admi-
ralty. As a great political figure in early modern England, it also found 
itself occasionally tried in Parliament as well, such as when the interloper 
Thomas Skinner sued the Company in the House of Lords in 1668 for 
offenses against his property and person in the East Indies.52 There were 
also an increasing number of laws promulgated by Parliament in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century that specifically and aggressively ex-
panded the reach of English law to India, and over the East India Com-
pany.53 
Yet, even after the promulgation of new forms of legal oversight of 
the Company from home, the East India Company in Asia nonetheless 
continued to operate its own courts and establish its own law, which 
were not fully encompassed under the ambit of English courts.54 In par-
ticular, the treaty-making capacities of the East India Company high-
lighted the uncertain and situational nature of its legal personhood, espe-
cially after its expansion as a territorial power in the late eighteenth cen-
tury. This principle was tested in a 1791 suit against the Company 
brought in Chancery by the nawab of Arcot, the ruler of a state in south-
ern India, seeking settlement of an outstanding debt. The court found it 
could not rule, since, as the Company argued, the matter depended upon 
a treaty between two powers—the nawab and the Company—acting as 
independent sovereigns. As such, an English court had no jurisdiction, as 
“[t]he power, which the Company exercise upon these occasions, is in 
fact that of a state.” 55 As the court observed, the issue related to: 
[A] treaty between sovereigns concerning the public business of 
each sovereignty; and it is insisted generally, that upon such treaty 
so described . . . a treaty between sovereigns respecting the public 
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business of their respective sovereignties actio non oritur . . . . 
[T]hat by the law and municipal constitution of this country the 
Company having a right to make war for the defence and meliora-
tion of their trade, are advised, that they being armed by the charters 
and municipal authority of this country with that power, stand in all 
respects relating to the exercise of it in the same condition as if sov-
ereigns. 56 
Though “whether they are independent sovereigns, or whether they 
exercise a delegated sovereignty, neither of which can possibly be true, 
for they are neither the one nor the other, but mere subjects in that re-
spect, and remain so in consideration of law to all purposes,” the court 
pointed out that the Company in this capacity acted not as “mere sub-
jects” but as a public body.57  A similar principle—that certain pleas 
against the company had to be comprehended as “acts of state”—was 
cited in Moodalay v. East India Company (1785), East India Company v. 
Syed Ally (1827), Bedreechund v. Elphinstone (1830), and Gibson v. East 
India Company (1839).58 In each of these cases, either the treaty (i.e., 
peace) or war-making capacity of the East India Company seemed to 
render unto it the status of an act of state. That such diplomacy was often 
conducted in its own name rather than the name of England or the Crown 
only further suggested limitations on the ability to seek redress in court 
for the Company’s actions in its political capacity.59 As John Hovenden 
glossed, in his annotations to Vesey’s Reports: “That a political treaty, 
between sovereigns, or parties exercising sovereign authority, cannot be 
the subject of municipal jurisdiction; but that its observance, or neglect, 
must depend on that respect which the parties bound thereby can be 
made to feel for the jus gentium, is established by the final result of this 
case.”60 
While the case law cited above followed the Company’s assump-
tion of territorial power after the mid-eighteenth century, the ambiguous 
and flexible relationship between the Company’s status as a public and a 
private actor was in many ways part of its constitution from the very be-
ginning. In the early modern period, such distinctions were difficult to 
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make for various corporate bodies, from cities to universities. 61 Those 
lines were only more blurry in the case of the overseas company that was 
both subject and sovereign at the same time, a problem engaged perhaps 
most famously by Dutch legal theorist Hugo Grotius. As a small cottage 
industry of legal historical scholarship has recently shown, Grotius—
though frequently cited as an architect of the so-called Westphalian sys-
tem of state sovereignty—forged his ideas directly in response to his 
work and advocacy for the early seventeenth-century Dutch East India 
Company’s claims against Portuguese sovereignty in the East Indies.62 
His arguments on the subject are most pronounced in his manuscript 
treatise, De Jure Praedae Commentarius (Commentary on the Law of 
Prize and Booty), which he himself understood as De Indis (On the In-
dies); though not printed in full until the nineteenth century, one chapter 
was published in 1609 anonymously as Mare Liberum, a short book 
which was almost immediately translated into English by the colonial 
promoter Richard Hakluyt, not unlikely on a commission from the Eng-
lish East India Company.63  
Grotius’ perspective was informed deeply by intelligence and in-
formation provided by the Dutch East India Company. In turn, his work 
was oriented towards legitimating not only the rights of the Dutch to en-
gage in the East Indies trade—in apparent violation of Portuguese claims 
to exclusive rights in the entirety of the eastern hemisphere—but also 
towards justifying the Dutch Company’s violence against the Portuguese 
in making those incursions, in particular the seizure of the Portuguese 
carrack Santa Catarina in 1603.64 As he wrote, 
[E]ven though people grouped as a whole and people as private in-
dividuals do not differ in the natural order, a distinction has arisen 
from a man-made fiction and from the consent of citizens. The law 
of nations, however, does not recognize such distinctions; it places 
public bodies and private companies in the same category. Now, it 
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is generally agreed that private societies are subject to the rule that 
whatever is owed by the companies themselves may be exacted 
from their individual partners. Furthermore, it is obvious that the 
state is constituted by individuals just as truly as the magistrate is 
constituted by the state, and that therefore the said individuals are 
liable in the same fashion as the state in so far as concerns repara-
tion for losses, even when the claim in question is founded on 
wrongdoing.65 
According to Grotius, there was no distinction to be made between 
the moral personality of individuals and collections of individuals, in-
cluding their natural right to wage war. As he suggested further, 
Nature—the mistress and sovereign authority in this matter—
withholds from no human being the right to carry on private wars; 
and therefore, no one will maintain that the East India Company is 
excluded from the exercise of that privilege, since whatever is right 
for single individuals is likewise right for a number of individuals 
acting as a group.66 
By developing a notion of just war that derived from the individual, 
as Richard Tuck has observed, Grotius was thus able to conclude that 
“private trading companies were as entitled to make war as were the tra-
ditional sovereigns of Europe.”67 Likewise, a theory of sovereignty as 
divisible, articulated as well in his Commentarius in Theses XI, legiti-
mated not only the Dutch revolt from Spain, as well as the republican 
structure of the Netherlands itself, but also Dutch practices of             
treaty-making with assorted powers in Asia, even when the claims to 
sovereign rights among them overlapped or were in competition with one 
another.68 At the same time, the theory reflected back on Europe itself, 
suggesting an international legal personality for the corporation, in which 
sovereignty was not only divisible among Asian rulers but able to be par-
celed among European monarchs, republics, corporations, and even indi-
viduals, especially when acting in the extra-European world.69  
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Grotius was hardly alone in the early modern period in suggesting 
that sovereignty rested not solely in a singular state but rather a patch-
work of individuals and corporate bodies acting in various public capaci-
ties. Indeed, such arguments echoed and exported to problems in the ex-
tra-European world an anti-absolutist tradition in early modern political 
thought, which made space for pluralistic notions of law and sovereignty. 
Such arguments were embodied particularly, as was the case for Johan-
nes Althusius, another ideological advocate for the Dutch revolt, in asso-
ciational life and thus varieties of corporate bodies politic.70 As Martin 
van Gelderen has noted, according to Althusius, “As a civil and symbi-
otic animal, man is part of the web of associations that encompass the 
fullness of communal, social, and political life. . . . Politics is not con-
fined to the level of the civitas and respublica; it covers all symbiotic 
associations.”71 
Such a conception of the associational corporation as a foundation 
rather than a product of sovereign power was only amplified by the pecu-
liar geospatial context in which bodies like the English East India Com-
pany operated. Rooted in Europe, in transit across several oceans and 
maritime spaces, and operating throughout a patchwork of jurisdictions 
in Asia, the corporation had to be juridically flexible.72 It had a “status 
mixtus” as a chartered subject of the English Crown, a party to treaties 
with or even as a tributary vassal of Asian principalities (such as the 
Mughal Empire), and a power exercising sovereign prerogative, such as 
war-making or coinage, in its own right.73 This meant that as a legal per-
son, the Company was capable of being both sovereign and subject sim-
ultaneously, while also weaving itself through various different jurisdic-
tional contexts and a myriad of legal regimes. Such divisible sovereignty 
rendered the Company susceptible to exactions and supervision by mul-
tiple forms of power at the same time. 
Thus, for example, after 1689, with the ascendency of Parliament 
following the English Glorious Revolution, the East India Company 
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came under increasing scrutiny, nearly to the point of its abolition.74 This 
was fueled, at least in part, by concerns about the Company’s commer-
cial monopoly and the desire of rivals to either partake in or simply take 
over the English Indies trade. However, a good deal of the scrutiny fo-
cused on the Company’s political practices, including a “bribery” scandal 
at home and criticism of the Company’s use of martial law and capital 
punishment in its settlements abroad.75 At the same time, the Company 
faced increasing exactions from officials in Asia, which led both to the 
Company’s declaration of war against the Mughal Empire in 1686 and 
the invasion and occupation of English Bombay by a Mughal tributary 
force for sixteen months in 1689–1690.76 In turn, reports of the Compa-
ny’s trials in Asia, especially its war with the Mughal Empire, fueled its 
opposition and governmental inquiry in England, as the reports were cit-
ed extensively both in the political press and as evidence before commit-
tees of the House of Commons.77  Likewise, word of the Company’s 
weakness in England made its way to the East Indies—via English and 
other European rivals—and undermined its authority with various offi-
cials there, especially at the powerful Mughal port city of Surat. 
Yet, the corporation’s subjection to multiple regulatory and sover-
eign regimes simultaneously was not only a source of vulnerability, but 
potentially a source of great power. The Company took recourse to its 
status as a chartered English corporation frequently in diplomatic and 
other exchanges with the Mughal, Safavid, and other powers, particularly 
in the cases made against interlopers—English subjects trading in Asia 
without the Company’s license or permission. Likewise, one of the 
Company’s chief strategies in the English debates in the 1690s was to 
cite to Parliament and King William III the grants it held from Asian 
powers, rents it collected in its settlements abroad, and the people over 
whom it governed and had authority. The very fact of the Company’s 
responsibilities and obligations abroad required, they insisted, that “they 
shall have a Legall Existence” and be “continued a Corporation . . . in 
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their Publick, as Private Capacityes.”78 Such jurisdictional fluidity of the 
East India Company was not simply a convenient practice but a legal 
pluralism inherent to the institutional structure of a corporation, especial-
ly a corporation that operated overseas and among and amidst various 
jurisdictional spaces.79 
III. COMPANY AS INTERNATIONAL ACTOR 
Far from eliminated by more singular notions of state sovereignty, 
this early modern conception of political authority as divisible and frag-
mented has survived into the modern era in various forms. For example, 
eighteenth-century American debates over federalism were deeply con-
nected to this debate, from Grotius to Pufendorf, over the degree to 
which, as Alison LaCroix has put it, “political authority might cross ju-
risdictional boundaries and, on occasion, be shared among multiple states 
tied into a single system.”80 Moreover, nineteenth-century international 
legal writing, such as that of Henry Sumner Maine, continued to echo 
Grotian ideas about sovereignty as a “bundle or collection of pow-
ers . . . [that] may be separated one from another,” to which British India 
stood as prime evidence.81 Such ideas also reverberated in ideological 
justifications for both settler and “informal” forms of empire well into 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.82 
The persistence of these ideas, particularly in the form of empire, 
offers a serious challenge to normative conceptions of international legal 
order embodied solely in a system composed exclusively of territorially 
bounded states.83 Moreover, the endurance of the theory and practice of 
divisible sovereignty suggests a powerful mutability between the corpo-
ration’s capacity to own and manage private property and its public func-
tions as a form of jurisdiction and government, navigating in a unique 
way between the twin poles of dominium and imperium.84 Thus, recog-
nizing the degree to which bodies like the East India Company acted as 
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sovereign bodies rather than purely commercial ones similarly suggests 
“a departure from a strictly state-centric approach to international law,” 
which continues to resonate today.85 After all, as Eric Wilson has put it, 
“[i]n terms of Corporate Sovereignty, contemporary TNCs display a re-
markable similarity to seventeenth-century joint-stock companies.”86 
But why? Referring merely to the resemblance between the East 
India Company and the features—what early modern theorists might call 
“marks”—of sovereignty, such as military power or territorial control, 
runs the risk of leading one down the same path as those who see in the 
Company analogies to modern business practices. Instead, what the East 
India Company’s history shows us is how state and corporation are mu-
tually constituted, and in fact, derive from similar and shared ideological 
and historical contexts. Thus, it is the complexities and contradictions in 
the corporation as both a private and public actor that raises questions 
that may be useful for upsetting our normative assumptions about pre-
cisely what, where, and how corporations operate in a global and trans-
national context. As Joshua Barkan has argued, the unique power of the 
corporation as an institution created by the state and constantly standing 
in opposition to and outside of it can be seen as an extension of the early 
modern corporate sovereignty exhibited by bodies like the East India 
Company which are only amplified in an age of modern globalization.87 
As such, if the history of the colonial corporation cautions us not to 
regard the distinction of public and private as natural, or historically or 
legally fixed, the history of the East India Company may be rendered 
apposite as an example of the modern corporation not because it resem-
bled modern forms of capital organization but because it, in somewhat 
exaggerated ways, blends the public and private and the commercial and 
political in ways many transnational corporations, from state-owned en-
terprises to “private” banks, do today.88 Historians and theorists who 
propose such a perspective offer a middle way between imagining the 
East India Company as a direct antecedent to the multinational commer-
cial corporation and envisioning it as a “deviation” from that develop-
ment. Indeed, the very feature that made the Company seem to be anom-
alous—its blend of public and private legal personalities—may be pre-
cisely the lesson it offers for our contemporary world: “[I]ts unique com-
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bination of the time perspectives of power with the time perspectives of 
profit, in other words the balance between the forces of the market and 
the power of government.”89 Such a history recalls the corporation’s ori-
gins as something far more abstract, transcendent, and public.90  
The recognition that the East India Company looked far more like 
an abstract person of the state than a natural person prompts a reconsid-
eration, as Janet McLean has argued, of what a company’s rights, re-
sponsibilities, and personality before the law should be, especially in the 
international arena.91 Jenny Martinez has similarly shown that precisely 
this history of the East India Companies and others reveals “both public 
and private international law have not adequately grappled with the prob-
lem of transnational regulation of large multinational corporations, and 
that part of the reason for this failure is the heavy reliance of both fields 
on concepts of territoriality and state-centric sovereignty.”92 Here Mar-
tinez points to two cases in particular as representing the “new territorial-
ism” that tests the bounds of this international law rooted in territoriality: 
Boumediene v. Bush,93 which raised the question of the applicability of 
habeas corpus at the United States detention center at Guantánamo Bay, 
and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,94 in which the majority found 
that the Alien Torts Statute did not give U.S. courts jurisdiction over for-
eign corporations accused of committing human rights violations.95 
Indeed, to only take this point a bit further, it is telling that in both 
these cases, legal historians filing amicus briefs with the court for the 
petitioners turned specifically to the history of the East India Company to 
make their case. In Boumedine, the extension of the writ of habeas cor-
pus to Company-controlled Bengal in the 1770s suggested a deep foun-
dation for imagining the writ ran in the English common law to extrater-
ritorial jurisdictions and, though under conditions, to non-English aliens 
outside the formal jurisdiction of England.96 This analogy—which was in 
fact cited in the D.C. Circuit Court opinion, but rejected as an imperfect 
analogy in Justice Kennedy’s opinion—to Company Bengal as an extra-
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territorial power that was not, in essence, an easy extension of British 
formal sovereignty even led one blogger to proclaim that “GTMO is the 
British East India Company.”97 It is worth noting as well that the East 
India Company vigilantly resisted the suggestion that habeas applied in 
its territories, maintaining that English common and municipal law could 
not be easily transplanted to India or to Company rule, the nature of both 
being in some measure distinct from English law.98 
In Kiobel, the historians turned, again for the petitioners, to a much 
earlier and very different set of arguments: the seventeenth-century cri-
tique of the Company’s monopoly, and in particular the case, mentioned 
above, of Skinner v. East India Co. (1668). The argument ran that the 
finding of liability of the Company for seizing the goods and person in 
India of the English interloper Thomas Skinner suggested a long com-
mon law precedent for domestic courts adjudicating causes against cor-
porations abroad; thus, there should be no corporate exception to liability 
under international law or extraterritorial U.S. tort law.99 
Of course, here again, however, the precedent rests on the assump-
tion that the East India Company was “a precursor to the modern busi-
ness corporation.”100 Yet, one only need turn to the rest of the story of the 
Skinner case to see the greater ambiguities of the English state’s jurisdic-
tion over the Company’s activities abroad. The House of Lords found for 
Skinner against the Company, but almost immediately this decision 
prompted a multi-sided struggle among the Lords, the House of Com-
mons, the King, and the Company. Dismissing Skinner’s claims as ab-
surd—and even suggesting he was not English but Dutch—the Company 
managed to also rouse jealousies in the House of Commons over whether 
the Lords even had the right to try the case in the first place. Before long, 
the dispute became so heated that both Skinner and the Company’s gov-
ernor ended up subject to imprisonment orders from the respective hous-
es of Parliament. Seeking a resolution to the issue to no avail, by 1670, 
King Charles II had simply vacated all of the proceedings, giving a de 
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facto victory to the Company and rendering the case into oblivion—as if 
it had never happened.101 In the end, Skinner actually found no redress 
for his grievances; he was still looking for compensation as late as the 
1690s, and his son continued to press his case into the first decade of the 
eighteenth century.102 Far from offering a context for municipal jurisdic-
tion over the human rights abuses of corporations abroad, this case, in 
many respects, reinforced the validity of the Company’s jurisdiction and 
monopoly overseas and its immunity from prosecution for actions taken 
under its government. This position was only reinforced further in East 
India Company v. Thomas Sandys, a case tried before the Court of 
King’s Bench, in 1683–1685, though this principle would again be called 
into question after the Glorious Revolution of 1688–1689 only to be rein-
forced again in the eighteenth century.103 
CONCLUSIONS? 
In the end, there is no clear conclusion or answer to be drawn from 
this brief exploration of the historiography of the East India Company as 
an exemplar and originator of the nature of the modern corporation. My 
intention has simply been to show how difficult drawing easy and clear 
connections in this regard can be. That said, if the East India Company’s 
history as a political actor offers any lessons for our present predica-
ments, it might be to offer some skepticism about expecting domestic or 
municipal law to be able to redress grievances against a corporation act-
ing in negotiation, alliance, or conflict with other sovereign powers—be 
they companies, states, or empires. Not only do these corporations far 
exceed the territorial grasp of the state, the ambiguity of their activities 
as simultaneously public and private also renders them difficult to parse 
within the ambit of nationally sovereign courts. If in the East India Com-
pany’s period it was the jus gentium—the law of nations—that ultimately 
needed to fully govern the actions of multinational corporations as much 
as states, it would suggest that one might need instead to turn to interna-
tional law as the arena best suited to serve as a robust regulatory and 
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governmental regime over the moral, ethical, and human rights behavior 
of transnational corporations. This is especially the case as more and 
more we see how ethereal and elusive corporations can be, shifting na-
tional allegiance and residence with ease.104 To take one example, we 
need only to look to questions about the environmental regulation of cor-
porations and corporate interest and involvement in ongoing global cli-
mate summits to recognize that states are not the only actors on this 
global stage.105 What the solution in international law might be is beyond 
the scope of this Article, but if the East India Company’s example sug-
gests anything, it is that recognizing the distinct public character and per-
sonality of the corporation when acting as such, considering the ways in 
which global governance might need to include corporations not as sub-
jects but as actors, and contending with these questions of rights and ob-
ligations as it does with states, would not be a new, but centuries-old 
place to start. 
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